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Abstract
Most macroeconomic models treat the central bank and the trea-
sury as a unified entity. The balance sheet of the central bank is
therefore implicitly treated as an accounting fiction. While this is
often realistic, the central bank balance sheet has implications for
central bank independence. There are wide differences in the
nature of central bank balance sheets today, with the US and
ESCB balance sheets nearly at the extremes. The reasons for
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Abstract. Most macroeconomic models treat the central bank and the trea-
sury as a uniﬁed entity. The balance sheet of the central bank is therefore
implicitly treated as an accounting ﬁction. While this is often realistic, the
central bank balance sheet has implications for central bank independence.
There are wide diﬀerences in the nature of central bank balance sheets today,
with the US and ESCB balance sheets nearly at the extremes. The reasons for
and implications of these diﬀerences are studied here.
I. Introduction
There are two ideal models of a central bank, of which actual central banks are
usually a mixture. In type F, which is close to describing the US Federal Reserve
system, the central bank’s balance sheet is always perfectly hedged, with short
term interest-bearing nominal bond assets and high-powered money liabilities
that leave almost no risk of balance sheet problems. There is a single government
budget constraint, reﬂecting the certainty that mature government bonds can
always be redeemed for high powered money and the fact that there is no doubt
that potential central bank balance sheet problems are nothing more than a type
of ﬁscal liability for the treasury.
In type E, which seems to be the model underlying the constitution of the
ECB and which (in an extreme version) is close to matching currency-board
arrangements like that in Hong Kong, the central bank holds assets whose return
distributions do not match those of its liabilities, but are intended to act as
reserves, guaranteeing a lower bound on the value of its high-powered money
liabilities in terms of some other store of value. In this model, the central bank
budget constraint is distinct from that of the treasury (or in the case of the ECB,
treasuries). Mature nominal government debt might not, in some circumstances,
be convertible at par into high-powered money, and conversely it is not obvious
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that a treasury would automatically see central bank balance sheet problems as
its own liability.
In either model, central bank policy actions aimed at controlling the price level
have budgetary implications. There is a ﬂow of interest earnings on assets held
by the central bank that generally exceeds any interest it pays out on liabilities,
most of which is usually turned over to the treasury. There may also be other
cash ﬂows between the central bank and the treasury as the bank buys and sells
assets in the market. The essence of central bank independence is that these
cash ﬂows are regarded simply as byproducts of a central bank monetary policy
aimed at meeting its assigned policy objectives, with no presumption that the
treasury or the legislature requires any commitment from the central bank to
provide speciﬁed or minimum cash ﬂows.
In most advanced economies it is now the norm that the treasury is not allowed
to require the central bank to purchase given amounts of treasury debt. Equally
important, it is conventional nearly everywhere to treat the central bank’s interest
earnings as a residual item in the budget, with no discussion of targets for such
revenue. In unusual but nonetheless important circumstances, however, central
bank seignorage revenue, interpreted broadly as changes in its net worth, can
become negative. The convention that other branches of government are not
concerned with the level of the central bank’s interest earnings does not usually
extend to such cases of negative seignorage, and this fact constitutes a limitation
on the level of independence available to the central bank.
In model F, this potential limitation is kept a very remote possibility by the
structure of the bank balance sheet. Of course surprise changes in asset prices can
occur, but with assets that are short-term, interest-bearing and denominated in
the same units as nearly all of its liabilities, there is very little room for disparate
movements in the values of the central bank’s assets and liabilities.
In model E, the bank must balance a risk of negative shocks to its balance
sheet against the principle that it should be capable of allowing and weathering a
government default. It therefore acquires assets whose risks are not as perfectly
correlated with those of its currency liabilities as with model E. Foreign exchange
reserves, for example, are always subject to sudden revaluation, as are any secu-
rities issued by private entities. A model E central bank can minimize the risk of
balance sheet problems by diversifying its portfolio of assets, by investing only in
securities issued by the most sound and stable entities, and by building up net
worth through incomplete rebate of interest earnings to the treasury. Each of
these approaches, however, implies some important limits on the bank’s freedom
of action.
Another route by which Model E independence might be undermined is the
treatment of seignorage revenue. If bank net worth is not to grow exponentially,FISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 3
there must be a rule requiring that earnings in excess of expenses be turned
over to a treasury (or some other entity). This is of course true of Model F
central banks as well, but for a Model E bank the oversight may be less strong,
because of its weaker links to the treasury. Also, for a Model E bank the problems
that would be created by negative net worth provide an apparent rationale for
indeﬁnite accumulation of positive net worth. But when this occurs, as in Hong
Kong’s case, the large positive net worth is likely itself to become a threat to
bank independence. Political pressure to use the accumulated wealth for some
worthwhile public purpose may be strong. If the seignorage is regularly turned
over to the treasury, and if the revenue grows very large, the treasury is likely to
come to depend on it and to apply pressure to avoid its shrinking. In defense,
the central bank is likely to be tempted to expand its mission, for example by
undertaking to be a backup source of liquidity for a growing list of types of
ﬁnancial institutions. But such “mission creep” exposes the bank to new risks
and therefore again to limitations on its ability to control the price level.
1
Both ideal models can provide a stable price level, and the diﬀerences between
them may not appear important in normal times. But in any general equilibrium
model, uniqueness and stability of the price level depends on beliefs of the public
about how the system would react in the face of extreme circumstances like very
high inﬂation, severe ﬁnancial instability, or deﬂations in which the zero lower
bound on nominal interest rates is approached. The kind of behavior required of
the central bank and the treasury in such circumstances is diﬀerent under the two
models. Because of these diﬀerences, the ability of severe disturbances to force
policy-makers to allow a deviation from price stability also diﬀers across the two
models.
II. Informal Discussion of Conditions for Existence and
Uniqueness
We will consider an economy in which barter equilibrium, with real balances
zero, is a non-trivial possibility. This could be because use of a foreign currency
for transactions is possible, or because electronic payments systems could expand
greatly if the cost of holding money was held high enough, or simply because
people are ingenious (as recently in certain sectors of the Russian economy).
Suppose monetary policy simply ﬁxes M = ¯ M, where M is the quantity of
non-interest-bearing currency. If there are no disturbances to the economy, this
policy is likely to be consistent with a unique, constant price level, under either
model of the central bank. However, it is also generally consistent with the pure
1See Kwan and Lui (1999) for a discussion of the evolution of the Hong Kong exchange fund
and the ambiguity of its mission.FISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 4
barter equilibrium in which money is valueless. Monetary theory has made it
clear by now that these are usually not the only two equilibria. Usually there is
a continuum of equilibria, one for every initial value of the price level above the
level ¯ p that is consistent with constant p. In each of these equilibria, the price
level explodes upward, velocity explodes upward, and real balances shrink toward
zero, so the economy approaches barter.
These explosive equilibria can be eliminated if the ﬁxed-M policy is supple-
mented with a commitment to support the value of money at some ceiling level
of prices P = P ¤. The policy would be that the central bank or the treasury
would stand ready to sell arbitrary amounts of real goods in return for money
at the price P ¤. The model E central bank can make such a commitment if it
owns a stock F of a “real” asset, and if it has chosen P ¤ such that ¯ M=P ¤ < F.
Note that it requires no assist from the treasury in making such a commitment
and that there is no requirement that ¯ M= ¯ P < F. The bank can be at negative
net worth all the time. Because speculators know that the bank’s commitment
to redeem money will not come into play until the price level has risen to P ¤, the
speculators can see that the explosive paths are not sustainable, which will force
any initial P > ¯ P immediately back down to ¯ P.
An economy with a model F central bank can also rule out these explosive
demonetization equilibria, but to do so requires treasury intervention. Because
on the inﬂation path the assets of the bank are shrinking as fast as its liabilities,
the ratio of its net worth to the value of M will not grow as inﬂation proceeds. A
credible commitment to redeem money at P ¤ requires a commitment to use the
power to tax.
As recently pointed out by Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (1998), in-
determinacy problems can also arise as uncontrollable deﬂations, with interest
rates stuck at zero. If we pay no attention to ﬁscal policy, this outcome seems
a remote possibility with an M = ¯ M policy, as the real value of currency out-
standing increases without bound as price drops, and the resulting wealth eﬀect
should make the downward spiral unsustainable. Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and
Uribe get their result by assuming that the ﬁscal authority treats the rising real
value of central bank liabilities as treasury liabilities that must be backed with
taxation, thereby oﬀsetting the real balance eﬀect on private wealth. As the re-
cent example of Japan shows, this type of ﬁscal reaction to deﬂation is not as
implausible as it sounds at ﬁrst. Of course in Japan there have been large ﬁscal
deﬁcits, but these are accompanied by rhetoric about what a large burden of fu-
ture taxation or reduced expenditure these deﬁcits imply. Furthermore, a central
bank concerned about its deteriorating balance sheet can take quasi-ﬁscal actions
that contribute to further deﬂation. An example is the sharp increase in reserve
requirements imposed by the US Federal Reserve before the 1937 recession. AFISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 5
bank with such concerns could also hoard interest earnings and refrain from bold,
risky open market purchases to sustain ﬁscal institutions or end the deﬂation.
Since this kind of indeterminacy is primarily a problem of bad ﬁscal policy,
models E and F do not directly imply diﬀerent outcomes here. However, to the
extent that the central bank has the power to make risky open market purchases
to end the deﬂation, it requires an understanding that it will if necessary have
ﬁscal backing. This is a natural possibility (if not at all inevitable) for a model
F bank. For a model E bank it apparently violates the essence of its “indepen-
dence”. Such a bank might therefore be more likely to see no feasible action
available to it in a liquidity trap.
Another simple policy is a pure price peg. Of course such a policy presents
implementation problems in practice, but assume for now that it is possible.2 A
bank with positive net worth can implement a price peg. The peg will not be
subject to speculative attack because of the net worth cushion. But as soon as the
bank’s net worth becomes negative at the pegged price, it becomes unsustainable
and multiple equilibria, corresponding to possibility of random speculative attack
that demonetizes the economy, arise. Obviously a type F bank, because it is much
more reliably cushioned against negative net worth, is more likely to be able to
sustain a price peg.
Finally, there is the possibility of a pure nominal interest rate peg. It is one of
the main novel results of the ﬁscal theory of the price level that such equilibria
are sustainable, with stable prices, if ﬁscal policy is appropriate. For a type F
bank the interest rate peg becomes in eﬀect a commitment to monetize a ﬁxed
fraction of variation in the level of nominal debt, and prices become proportional
to the quantity of nominal debt. This requires that the ﬁscal authorities generate
a “nominal anchor”, by not not basing their rule for real taxation on a measure
of real debt outstanding. This type of equilibrium obviously requires tight co-
ordination between the central bank and ﬁscal authorities, so it is inconsistent
with the type E model. It is likely to imply a less smooth path for the price level
than a price-targeting policy or a ﬁxed-M policy, but it has the appeal that it
narrows the amplitude of swings in the level of taxation compared to the other
equilibria, which is appealing on eﬃciency grounds if taxes are distorting.3
We can summarize the implications of these discussions as follows. A type F
central bank depends on ﬁscal cooperation and backup under certain conditions
if it is to guarantee a stable price level. If it can rely on such backup, it will need
to invoke it only very rarely, so its eﬀective degree of independence may be great.
A type E bank can do without ﬁscal backup under certain conditions in which a
2We will see below that price level targeting via an interest rate instrument gives qualitatively
similar results.
3See Sims (1999a) and references therein.FISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 6
type F bank would need it. But in a much broader set of conditions, a type E
bank will ﬁnd the need to maintain or attain positive net worth a constraint on
its ability to tightly control the price level.
There is no unique answer as to which model will perform better. In an econ-
omy where the political system and ﬁscal expertise are low, the coordination and
restraint required of the treasury by a type F arrangement may not be available,
and the type E model may be more attractive. Certainly currency boards, which
are a type E arrangement, are more common in less developed countries. One
would think that in an economy as advance as that of Euroland, type F would
be the natural model. But since the ECB has a multitude of treasuries to deal
with, it is quite understandable that in the initial stages it is framed as a type E
bank.
III. Models F and E in general equilibrium
Our aim here is not to prove results in great generality, but to provide a simple
model within which the intertemporal equilibrium mechanisms are transparent.
We can reach some conclusions without being explicit about which type of central





¡¯t logCt dt (1)
with respect to the time paths of C, FP, B and M, subject to the constraint
C(1 + Ã(v)) + ˙ FP +
˙ M + ˙ B
P
= Y + ½FP +
˙ B
P
+ ¿ : (2)
Here C is consumption, v = PC=M is velocity of money, FP is private holdings of
the real asset, B is nominal government debt, M is money (non-interest-bearing
currency), Y is an exogenous endowment stream, and ¿ is transfer payments from
the government. The real and nominal interest rates are, respectively, ½ and ¿.
4Model F is dealt with in detail in other papers. Closest to this one in ideas and motivation
is Sims (1999b), but see also Sims (1997). This paper’s theory diﬀers in that it considers model
E and in that it allows the private sector to borrow and lend externally at a ﬁxed real rate.FISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 7
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0v) : (6)
These equations can be reduced to











(2Ã0 + Ã00v2)˙ v
1 + Ã + Ã0v
: (9)
Note that in all these equations we are supposing that the economy evolves with-
out uncertainty after t = 0, but that some variables may change discontinuously
at t = 0. Thus all time derivatives (dotted variables) are to be interpreted as
right-derivatives.
Now suppose that the monetary authority adopts an “active” monetary policy
in the terminology of Leeper (1991), for example that it targets the price level,
using an interest rate instrument. Such a policy could take the form of setting
the nominal interest rate according to
r = µ0 + µ1p ; (10)
where p is the log of the price level. Combining (10) with (7) gives us
˙ p = µ0 + µ1p ¡ ½ : (11)
We will suppose that ½ is set exogenously, and is constant except possibly for a
discontinuous change at t = 0. Equation (11) is easily seen to be an unstable
equation with a unique non-explosive solution:
p ´ ¯ p = (½ ¡ µ0)=µ1 : (12)
If the initial value of p exceeds ¯ p, p explodes exponentially upward, while if the
initial value is below ¯ p, it explodes downwards.
Notice that if the explosive paths are not equilibria, the price level is constant
in equilibrium regardless of the size of µ1, so long as it is positive. That is, the
response of interest rates to price level changes can be as small as we like withoutFISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 8
altering the conclusion that the price level is constant. However, if we consider
the eﬀects of an exogenous shift in ½ at t = 0, the conclusion is diﬀerent. It is
natural to suppose that the monetary authority cannot accurately track the real
rate, so it will not be able to oﬀset changes in it by changing µ0. In this case
equation (12) can be read as describing how p reacts to exogenous shifts in ½, and
we can see that the amount of price change produced by a shift in ½ is smaller,
the larger is µ1. That is, by moving the nominal rate aggressively in response to
changes in the price level, the monetary authority can keep the price level more
stable in the presence of exogenous variation in the real rate.
Now we must consider whether it is indeed possible to exclude the explosive
paths for the price level as possible equilibria. To illustrate how the model works,





This speciﬁcation implies that as v ! 1, transactions costs converge to a ﬁnite
limit, so that a barter equilibrium, with zero real balances, is technologically
viable. In this setting (8) becomes
r =
Ã0v2
(1 + v)2 ; (14)
and it is then easily seen that we can satisfy this equation and (11) in the stable,
constant-price equilibrium only if Ã0 > ½.
Assuming this condition is met it is still possible for the economy to start on a
path for which initial p > ¯ p, which would require that r rise steadily. But in this
model, with this interest rate policy, there is an upper bound on p, because as
v ! 1, r ! Ã0. That is, there is a level r¤ of the nominal rate, corresponding,
via the policy equation, to a level p¤ of the log price level, at which the public
altogether gives up the use of currency for transactions purposes. When M has
reached zero, the monetary authority can no longer continue with conventional
interest rate policy, so to characterize equilibrium we need to describe monetary
policy behavior once M = 0.
One kind of modiﬁed policy that works here is a commitment to supply re-
serves F in return for currency at some price ratio ¯ ¯ p < p¤ at any time. If this
commitment is credible, it undermines the speculative dynamics that support the
explosive price paths. These paths can exist only because expectations of contin-
ued inﬂation, make high nominal interest rates and low real balances attractive
to private agents. If there is an upper bound ¯ ¯ p to p, then as the bound is reached,
expectations of reduced inﬂation will tend to increase demand for money, thereby
pushing down the price level. Foreseeing this, markets will push the price levelFISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 9
down even earlier, and so on, leaving us with no upwardly explosive paths as
equilibria.
But is it credible that the monetary authority can provide F in return for M
at the price level p¤? A model F central bank can do so if it is tightly linked to a
treasury with untapped powers to tax. Such a treasury can issue interest-bearing
debt that implies a credible commitment to future taxation, and the real value
of this debt will be stable. It can supply such debt to the central bank as fresh
injections of capital in the event that the bank were to run out of its own holdings
of assets. For a model E central bank, the answer to the question depends on its
balance sheet position. It is not required that the bank have positive net worth
at the price level p = ¯ p. By the time the price level has reached ¯ ¯ p > ¯ p, the real
value of the bank’s original liabilities will have been reduced, while the assets it
holds in the form of F will have retained their value. Along a path on which r
and p exploded upward, the bank will have to be selling reserves to absorb M in
order to keep r rising according to its policy. Its commitment to a price ceiling
at ¯ ¯ p is credible if its reserves are suﬃcient to absorb the whole money stock along
such a path. If ¯ ¯ p is enough larger than ¯ p, the commitment can be credible even
with substantially negative net worth for the bank at p = ¯ p. And with a credible
commitment, the explosive paths are eliminated as potential equilibria, so the
reserves are never called upon.
Of course if the reserves are not suﬃcient, then this interest rate policy is
subject to the same kind of speculative attack, multiple equilibrium scenario as
the pure price peg. We can ﬁnd from equations we have already derived that




That is, the percentage deviation above the stable price level at which demone-
tization is complete is a decreasing function of µ1. Thus in place of the extreme
result we obtained informally in discussing a price-pegging policy, we obtain a
more continuous analogue: the more tightly the central bank attempts to control
the price level with interest rates, the more sensitive it is to a blow to its net
worth.
While we now have the main results from this model that interest us, we have
computed only part of the equilibrium. It may not be obvious that there is a
complete equilibrium for an arbitrary exogenously ﬁxed ½. However, we do know
that if equilibrium exists under the price targeting policy, it will involve constant
prices, and therefore from (7) r = ½. Then from the liquidity preference relation
(8) and the deﬁnition of Ã (13), we can ﬁnd the constant equilibrium value of
v, which we can call ¯ v. Then turning to (9) we see that with v constant we will
have ˙ C=C = ½¡¯ constant as well. Thus if ½ increases from an initial value of ¯FISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 10
we shift from an equilibrium with constant C to one with exponentially growing
C. Since P and v are constant, M must grow in proportion to C.
Is such a growth path for C technically feasible? Under the assumption that
real assets F can be borrowed or purchased from abroad and pay a ﬁxed real rate
½, the increase in ½ will cause an initial drop in C, followed by steady growth
that can be ﬁnanced by a growing holding of real assets.
IV. Central bank Independence as Historical Reality
IV.1. Are ECB and the Fed actually examples of E and F?. This paper
has suggested that its type E and F categories correspond to the ECB and the US
Federal Reserve. This may be controversial, but it has at least some superﬁcial
plausibility. The documents deﬁning the ECB make it very clear that it is not
to hold directly debt issued by the EMU treasuries. They discuss explicitly the
possibility that countries that run irresponsible ﬁscal policies will ﬁnd themselves
paying premiums on their borrowing rates, which the ECB is committed not to
eliminate. Such premia could arise only if markets contemplate the possibility
that government debt might not be redeemable at par in some eventuality—that
is, that governments could default. Conversely, the very fact that there is a host
of ﬁscal authorities that would have to coordinate in order to provide backup
were the ECB to develop balance sheet problems suggests that such backup is
at least more uncertain than in the US. And ﬁnally the balance sheet of the
European System of central banks shows (in the November 2000 issue of the
Monthly Bulletin of the ECB, Table 1) that 54% of the system’s assets are non-
euro-denominated, more than enough to back all outstanding currency with non-
euro assets.
In contrast, the US Federal Reserve System manages the marketing of US
Federal Government debt, making the notion of its failing to redeem mature
debt at par seem bizarre, though not impossible. For a long time Treasury Notes
circulated alongside Federal Reserve Notes as currency in the US. Though this
is no longer the case, I think that there is still no legal barrier to the Treasury’s
deciding, if necessary to issue non-interest-bearing notes of modest denomination,
which adds to the diﬃculty of imagining Treasury securities not being redeemable
at par, in nominal terms. The Federal Reserve system, according to its 1999 86th
annual report, had only 4.9% of its assets in foreign-denominated form, which is
only a very small fraction of its outstanding currency liabilities.FISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 11
The Fed carries just 1.9% of its balance sheet in capital and reserves, while the
ECB has 6.7% in this category.5
All these diﬀerences ﬁt the pattern I have suggested for type F and E ap-
proaches to institutionalizing central bank independence, though of course there
remains plenty of room for disagreement.
IV.2. Mexico, Japan, Grover Cleveland. It is now widely accepted that the
Japanese central bank has in recent years been slow to move against persistent
deﬂation in part because of fears about what some suggested bold interventions
might do to its balance sheet. According to its November 2000 balance sheet as
reported on its website at http://www.boj.or.jp/en/dlong_f.htm, the Bank
of Japan is close to the type F model. It has only 3.5% of its assets in foreign
reserves, and less than 5% of its balance sheet in net worth. It has been suggested
that the Bank make massive purchases of long-term debt, or of foreign currency.
Either of these courses of action would leave its balance sheet subject to sudden
revaluation. The former would almost automatically create diﬃculties if it suc-
ceeded in undoing deﬂationary expectations, thereby reducing bond prices. The
latter would tend to improve the bank’s balance sheet if it created the desired
inﬂation and (thereby) devaluation, but because of the inherent unpredictability
of exchange rates would nonetheless create balance sheet risk. Either would re-
quire moving away from the type F model of a risk-matched balance sheet with
minimal risk of losing net worth.
The Bank of Mexico at the time of its last major crisis undertook long term
swap agreements with private banks, taking private loans oﬀ their hands in return
for government securities. As these agreements have expired, the private banks
fear that their viability will be impaired by the return of the now-questionable
loans. A ﬁscal bailout has been proposed, but, in part because the loans were
in many cases to inﬂuential members of the formerly dominant political party, it
has been extremely controversial. While I know of no clear eﬀect of this situation
on Bank of Mexico policy, it is clear that it is a situation that could make the
bank in future think twice about a similar intervention. Nearly any attempt to
shore up conﬁdence in a ﬁscal crisis by discounting privately issued securities will
face a central bank with the risk of a situation like this, in which ﬁscal backing
could prove necessary.
5Plus another 17.5% in “revaluation accounts”, whose meaning I’m not sure of. If they are
accumulated capital gains, they belong with the capital and reserves for current purposes and
would push the total to 24.2%.FISCAL ASPECTS OF INDEPENDENCE 12
V. Conclusion
What are the implications of the point of view developed in this paper for
the structure and policy of the ECB? For the ECB itself, there is no implied
critique of their existing framework. In fact, once we see the ECB as a type
E bank, their reluctance to fully embrace inﬂation targeting and their apparent
aﬀection for considering the quantity of money as one “pillar” of policy are more
understandable. As we have seen, aggressive inﬂation-targeting6 carries serious
risks for a type E bank, while stabilizing the quantity of money is less likely to
generate balance sheet problems.
But for the European Community as a whole, this analysis brings out some
unresolved problems that deserve attention. To help the ECB evolve toward the
more stable type F model, and thereby to help it compete as a world reserve
currency, the EMU will need to develop ﬁscal institutions capable of prompt and
strong actions at a Europe-wide level. This is a tall order, and may not be ﬁlled
any time soon, unless a ﬁnancial crisis forces some rapid political innovation. It
might be worthwhile for Europe to consider creating a ﬁscal emergency system to
be invoked only in time of ﬁnancial crisis. This, since it would be thought of as
a backstop to be rarely if ever used, might be easier to negotiate than a broader
ﬁscal integration. Lars Svensson has informed me that, at least at one point in
history, it was part of the legislation deﬁning the Swedish central bank that the
bank could require the treasury to issue interest-bearing debt that the bank could
use to replenish a gap in net worth. In Europe, any facility like this would have
to be negotiated in advance, to spread the ﬁscal burden across nations fairly. But
it seems a valuable arrangement to have made, and perhaps not so diﬃcult to
achieve.
The other side of this issue is that, while it is still in type E mode, the ECB
will be constantly tempted to let its balance sheet and net worth grow, to make
the prospect of balance sheet diﬃculties more remote. If the temptation is not
resisted, this could create serious long run problems both for the bank and for
the European political system. A very large accumulation of wealth in the center
of a system with weak political institutions is an invitation to trouble.
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